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Can Turing machines capture everything 
we can compute? 
Bhupinder Singh Anand 
If we define classical foundational concepts constructively, and introduce non-
algorithmic effective methods into classical mathematics, then we can bridge 
the chasm between truth and provability, and define computational methods 
that are not Turing computable. 
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1. Introduction 
In a short opinion paper, “Computation Beyond Turing Machines” [WG03], Peter 
Wegner and Dina Goldin advance the thesis that: 
“A paradigm shift is necessary in our notion of computational problem solving, so it 
can provide a complete model for the services of today's computing systems and 
software agents.” 
We note that Wegner and Goldin’s arguments, in support of their thesis, seem to reflect 
an extraordinarily eclectic view of mathematics, combining both acceptance of, and 
frustration at, the standard interpretations and dogmas of classical mathematical theory: 
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(i) ...Turing machines are inappropriate as a universal foundation for computational 
problem solving, and ... computer science is a fundamentally non-mathematical 
discipline. 
(ii) (Turing’s) 1936 paper ... proved that mathematics could not be completely 
modeled by computers. 
(iii) ...the Church-Turing Thesis ... equated logic, lambda calculus, Turing machines, 
and algorithmic computing as equivalent mechanisms of problem solving. 
(iv) Turing implied in his 1936 paper that Turing machines ... could not provide a 
model for all forms of mathematics. 
(v) ...Gödel had shown in 1931 that logic cannot model mathematics ... and Turing 
showed that neither logic nor algorithms can completely model computing and human 
thought. 
These remarks vividly illustrate the Catch-22 situation, noted in Anand [An03c], with 
which not only Theoretical Computer Sciences, but all applied sciences that depend on 
mathematics - for providing a verifiable language to express their observations precisely - 
are faced:  
Are formal classical theories essentially unable to adequately express the extent and 
range of human cognition, or does the problem lie in the way formal theories are 
classically interpreted at the moment? The former addresses the question of whether 
there are absolute limits on our capacity to express human cognition unambiguously; 
the latter, whether there are only temporal limits - not necessarily absolute - to the 
capacity of classical interpretations to communicate unambiguously that which we 
intended to capture within our formal expression. 
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Prima facie, applied science continues, perforce, to interpret mathematical concepts 
Platonically, whilst waiting for mathematics to provide suitable, and hopefully reliable, 
answers as to how best it may faithfully express its observations verifiably.  
This dilemma is also reflected in Fortnow’s on-line rebuttal1 of Wegner and Goldin’s 
thesis, and of their reasoning. Thus Fortnow divides his faith between the standard 
interpretations of classical mathematics (and, possibly, the standard set-theoretical 
models of formal systems such as standard Peano Arithmetic), and the classical 
computational theory of Turing machines. He relies on the former to provide all the 
proofs that matter: 
“Not every mathematical statement has a logical proof, but logic does capture 
everything we can prove in mathematics, which is really what matters”; 
and, on the latter to take care of all essential, non-provable, truth:  
“...what we can compute is what computer science is all about”. 
However, as we argue later, Fortnow’s faith in a classical Church-Turing Thesis that 
ensures: 
“...Turing machines capture everything we can compute”, 
may be as misplaced as his faith in the infallibility of standard interpretations of classical 
mathematics. 
The reason: There are, prima facie, reasonably strong arguments for a Kuhnian paradigm 
shift; not, as Wegner and Goldin believe, in the notion of computational problem solving, 
but in the standard interpretations of classical mathematical concepts. 
                                               
1 Cf. Lance Fortnow’s Web Log <http://fortnow.com/lance/complog/archive/2003_04_06_archive.html>. 
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However, Wegner and Goldin could be right in arguing that the direction of such a shift 
must be towards the incorporation of non-algorithmic effective methods into classical 
mathematical theory; presuming, from the following remarks, that this is, indeed, what 
“external interactions” are assumed to provide beyond classical Turing-computability: 
(vi) ...that Turing machine models could completely describe all forms of 
computation ... contradicted Turing’s assertion that Turing machines could only 
formalize algorithmic problem solving ... and became a dogmatic principle of the 
theory of computation.  
(vii) ...interaction between the program and the world (environment) that takes place 
during the computation plays a key role that cannot be replaced by any set of inputs 
determined prior to the computation. 
(viii) ...a theory of concurrency and interaction requires a new conceptual framework, 
not just a refinement of what we find natural for sequential [algorithmic] computing. 
(ix) ...the assumption that all of computation can be algorithmically specified is still 
widely accepted. 
A widespread notion of particular interest, which seems to be recurrently implicit in 
Wegner and Goldin’s assertions too, is that mathematics is a dispensable tool of science, 
rather than its indispensable mother tongue. In Anand [An02] we argue that the roots of 
such beliefs may lie in ambiguities, in the classical definitions of foundational elements, 
that allow the introduction of non-constructive - hence non-verifiable, non-
computational, ambiguous, and essentially Platonic - elements into the standard 
interpretations of classical mathematics2.  
                                               
2 See, for instance, the arguments in Anand [An03b]. 
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Consequently, standard interpretations of classical theory may, inadvertently, be 
weakening a desirable perception - of mathematics as the lingua franca of scientific 
expression - by ignoring the possibility that, since mathematics is, indeed, indisputably 
accepted as the language that most effectively expresses and communicates intuitive 
truth, the chasm between formal truth and provability must, of necessity, be bridgeable.3 
We now consider one such bridge. 
2. Non-constructivity in classical theory 
We note that, in [Me90], Mendelson’s following remarks (italicised parenthetical 
qualifications added), implicitly imply that classical definitions of various foundational 
elements can be argued as being either ambiguous, or non-constructive, or both: 
"Here is the main conclusion I wish to draw: it is completely unwarranted to say that 
CT (Church’s Thesis) is unprovable just because it states an equivalence between a 
vague, imprecise notion (effectively computable function) and a precise mathematical 
notion (partial-recursive function). ... The concepts and assumptions that support the 
notion of partial-recursive function are, in an essential way, no less vague and 
imprecise (non-constructive, and intuitionistically objectionable) than the notion of 
effectively computable function; the former are just more familiar and are part of a 
respectable theory with connections to other parts of logic and mathematics. (The 
notion of effectively computable function could have been incorporated into an 
axiomatic presentation of classical mathematics, but the acceptance of CT made this 
unnecessary.) ... Functions are defined in terms of sets, but the concept of set is no 
clearer (not more non-constructive, and intuitionistically objectionable) than that of 
function and a foundation of mathematics can be based on a theory using function as 
                                               
3 Of interest is Davis’ argument [Da95] that an unprovable truth may, indeed, be arrived at algorithmically. 
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primitive notion instead of set. Tarski's definition of truth is formulated in set-
theoretic terms, but the notion of set is no clearer (not more non-constructive, and 
intuitionistically objectionable), than that of truth. The model-theoretic definition of 
logical validity is based ultimately on set theory, the foundations of which are no 
clearer (not more non-constructive, and intuitionistically objectionable) than our 
intuitive (non-constructive, and intuitionistically objectionable) understanding of 
logical validity. ... The notion of Turing-computable function is no clearer (not more 
non-constructive, and intuitionistically objectionable) than, nor more mathematically 
useful (foundationally speaking) than, the notion of an effectively computable 
function."4 
3. Constructive definitions 
We further note that, if we accept that there can be non-algorithmic effective methods 
that are applicable individually, but not uniformly (algorithmically), then we can 
constructively express some of these classical notions5 of various foundational elements 
such as "mathematical object", "effective computability", "truth of a formula under an 
interpretation", "set", "Church's Thesis" etc., in terms of a smaller number of primitive - 
formally undefined but intuitively well-accepted as unambiguous - mathematical terms as 
below6: 
(i) Primitive mathematical object: A primitive mathematical object is any symbol for 
an individual constant, predicate letter, or a function letter, which is defined as a 
primitive symbol of a formal mathematical language. 
                                               
4 Reproduced from Bringsjord [Br93]. 
 
5 We take Mendelson [Me64] as a standard exposition of classical theory and its standard interpretations. 
 
6 All the technical terms are defined explicitly in Anand [An02]. 
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(ii) Formal mathematical object: A formal mathematical object is any symbol for an 
individual constant, predicate letter, or a function letter that is either a primitive 
mathematical object, or that can be introduced through definition into a formal 
mathematical language without inviting inconsistency.  
(iii) Mathematical object: A mathematical object is any symbol that is either a 
primitive mathematical object, or a formal mathematical object. 
(iv) Set: A set is the range of any function whose function letter is a mathematical 
object.  
(v) Individual computability: A number-theoretic function F(x) is individually 
computable if, and only if, given any natural number k, there is an individually 
effective method (which may depend on the value k) to compute F(k).  
(vi) Uniform computability: A number-theoretic function F(x) is uniformly 
computable if, and only if, there is a uniformly effective method (necessarily 
independent of x)  such that, given any natural number k, it can compute F(k). 
(vii) Effective computability: A number-theoretic function is effectively computable 
if, and only if, it is either individually computable, or it is uniformly computable.  
(viii) Individual truth: A string [F(x)]7 of a formal system P is individually true under 
an interpretation M of P if, and only if, given any value k in M, there is an individually 
effective method (which may depend on the value k) to determine that the interpreted 
proposition F(k) is satisfied in M ([Me64], p49-52).  
                                               
7 We use square brackets to distinguish between the uninterpreted string [F] of a formal system, and the 
symbolic expression “F” that corresponds to it under a given interpretation that unambiguously assigns 
formal, or intuitive, meanings to each individual symbol of the expression “F”. 
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(ix) Uniform truth: A string [F(x)] of a formal system P is uniformly true under an 
interpretation M of P if, and only if, there is a uniformly effective method (necessarily 
independent of x) such that, given any value k in M, it can determine that the 
interpreted proposition F(k) is satisfied in M.  
(x) Effective truth: A string [F(x)] of a formal system P is effectively true under an 
interpretation M of P if, and only if, it is either individually true in M, or it is uniformly 
true in M.  
(xi) Individual Church Thesis: If, for a given relation R(x), and any element k in some 
interpretation M of a formal system P, there is an individually effective method such 
that it will determine whether R(k) holds in M or not, then every element of the domain 
D of M is the interpretation of some term of P, and there is some P-formula [R'(x)] such 
that: 
R(k) holds in M if, and only if, [R'(k)] is P-provable. 
(In other words, the Individual Church Thesis postulates that, if a relation R is 
effectively decidable individually (possibly non-algorithmically) in an interpretation M 
of some formal system P, then R is expressible in P, and its domain necessarily consists 
of only mathematical objects, even if the predicate letter R is not, itself, a mathematical 
object.) 
(xii) Uniform Church Thesis: If, in some interpretation M of a formal system P, there 
is a uniformly effective method such that, for a given relation R(x), and any element k 
in M, it will determine whether R(k) holds in M or not, then R(x) is the interpretation in 
M of a P-formula [R(x)], and: 
   R(k) holds in M if, and only if, [R(k)] is P-provable. 
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(Thus, the Uniform Church Thesis postulates that, if a relation R is effectively 
decidable uniformly (necessarily algorithmically) in an interpretation M of a formal 
system P, then, firstly, R is expressible in P, and, secondly, the predicate letter R, and 
all the elements in the domain of the relation R, are necessarily mathematical objects.) 
4. Effective solvability of the Halting problem 
The significance of defining classical foundational concepts in a constructive, and, prima 
facie, in an intuitionistically unobjectionable way, is seen in the following argument. 
Theorem 1: The Uniform Church Thesis implies that the Halting problem is effectively 
solvable. 
Proof: If a number-theoretic function F(x) is Turing-computable, then it is partial 
recursive ([Me64], p233, Corollary 5.13). We may thus assume that such an F is obtained 
from a recursive function G by means of the unrestricted µ-operator; in other words, that 
(cf. [Me64], p214): 
F(x) = µy(G(x, y) = 0).  
If [H(x, y)] expresses ~(G(x, y) = 0) in a formal system of Arithmetic such as standard 
PA, we then consider the PA-provability, and truth in the standard interpretation M of 
PA, of the formula [H(a, y)] for a given numeral [a] of PA, as below:  
(a) Let Q1 be the meta-assertion that [H(a, y)] is not effectively true in M. Hence there 
is no effective method in M to determine that, for any given y in M, y satisfies [H(a, 
y)] classically. It follows that there is no uniformly effective method (algorithm/Turing 
machine) in M to determine that, for any given y in M, y satisfies [H(a, y)] classically. 
Since G(a, y) is recursive, it follows that there is some finite k such that any Turing 
machine T1(y) that computes G(a, y) will halt and return the value 0 for y = k.  
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(b) Next, let Q2 be the meta-assertion that [H(a, y)] is effectively true in the standard 
interpretation M of PA, but that there is no uniformly effective method 
(algorithm/Turing machine) in M to determine that, for any given y in M, y satisfies 
[H(a, y)] classically. 
Since G(a, y) is recursive, it follows that there is some finite k such that the T1(y) will 
halt, and return a symbol for self-termination (looping8) for y = k. 
(c) Finally, let Q3 be the meta-assertion that [H(a, y)] is effectively true in the standard 
interpretation M of PA, and that there is a uniformly effective method in M to 
determine that, for any given y in M, y satisfies [H(a, y)] classically. We then have that 
that [H(a, y)] is uniformly true in the standard interpretation M of PA.  
If we assume a Uniform Church Thesis, it then follows ([An02], Meta-lemma 8) that 
[H(a, y)] is PA-provable. Let h be the Gödel-number of [H(a, y)]. We consider, now, 
Gödel’s primitive recursive number-theoretic relation xBy ([Go31a], p22, definition 
45), which holds in M if, and only if, x is the Gödel-number of a proof sequence in PA 
for the PA-formula whose Gödel-number is y. It follows that there is some finite k such 
that any Turing machine T2(y), which computes the characteristic function of xBh, will 
halt and return the value 0 for x = k. 
Since Q1, Q2, and Q3 are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, it follows that, when run 
simultaneously over the sequence 1, 2, 3, ... of values for y, one of {T1(y) // T2(y)} will 
always halt for some finite value of y for any given a. 
Thus, the Halting problem is effectively solvable if we assume a Uniform Church 
Thesis.¶  
                                               
8 We note that any Turing machine can be designed to recognise a “looping” situation; it simply records 
every instantaneous tape description at the execution of each machine instruction, and compares the current 
instantaneous tape description with the record. It can thus be meta-programmed to abort a loop, and return a 
meta-symbol indicating self-termination. 
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Corollary 1.1: The Uniform Church Thesis implies that the parallel duo of Turing 
machines {T1(y) // T2(y)} is not a Turing machine. 
Corollary 1.2: The Uniform Church Thesis implies that the classical Church-Turing 
thesis is false. 
5. Is there a case for a Uniform Church Thesis? 
The question of whether, as Fortnow believes, Turing machines can “capture everything 
we can compute”, or whether, as Wegner and Goldin suggest, they are “inappropriate as a 
universal foundation for computational problem solving”, could, thus, be answered 
decisively if there were, indeed, a case for introducing non-algorithmic effective methods 
into classical mathematics, and for introducing constructive foundational concepts such 
as that of a Uniform Church Thesis. We address this issue in Anand [An02], Anand 
[An03a] and Anand [An03c].  
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